P?Beauty?Contest Nash Equilibrium : 2 / ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67.

P?Beauty?Contest Nash Equilibrium : 2 / ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67.. Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. Game when we restrict player's choices to . Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all . ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1).

For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all . The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). Game when we restrict player's choices to . ○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies.

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Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than. ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67. For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. ○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). For this purpose, the game is repeated with six different parameters. −i ) ∀ s ∈ si.

➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67.

➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67. Game when we restrict player's choices to . −i ) ∀ s ∈ si. Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). For this purpose, the game is repeated with six different parameters. ○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies. For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all .

➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than. ○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all .

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Game when we restrict player's choices to . ○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies. ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. −i ) ∀ s ∈ si. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all . From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than.

For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o.

Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67. For this purpose, the game is repeated with six different parameters. Game when we restrict player's choices to . From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than. For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. −i ) ∀ s ∈ si. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all . The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). ○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies.

Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. −i ) ∀ s ∈ si. For this purpose, the game is repeated with six different parameters. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67.

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−i ) ∀ s ∈ si. ○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies. Game when we restrict player's choices to . For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all . From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than. ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1).

From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than.

○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies. Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. Game when we restrict player's choices to . For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all . For this purpose, the game is repeated with six different parameters. −i ) ∀ s ∈ si. From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67.

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➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67. Game when we restrict player's choices to . The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. For this purpose, the game is repeated with six different parameters.

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Game when we restrict player's choices to . −i ) ∀ s ∈ si. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all .

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For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all . Game when we restrict player's choices to . ○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies.

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−i ) ∀ s ∈ si. For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). For this purpose, the game is repeated with six different parameters. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all .

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The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than. Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all . Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. Game when we restrict player's choices to .

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For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than. Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. ○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies. −i ) ∀ s ∈ si.

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The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o. Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗. ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67. For this purpose, the game is repeated with six different parameters.

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Game when we restrict player's choices to . ➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than. For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o.

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Game when we restrict player's choices to . From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than. −i ) ∀ s ∈ si. The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1). For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o.

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Game when we restrict player's choices to .

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From the nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than.

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○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies.

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Strategies finally lead to the unique nash equilibrium in which all .

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For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o.

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Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗.

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The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1).

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➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67.

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Game when we restrict player's choices to .

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For this purpose, the game is repeated with six different parameters.

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The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1).

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Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗.

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Game when we restrict player's choices to .

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For this purpose, the game is repeated with six different parameters.

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For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o.

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➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67.

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For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o.

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For the case where o a p < i, iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to a unique nash equilibrium in which all players announce o.

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Game when we restrict player's choices to .

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➢ all numbers ≤ 100 => 2/3(average) < 67.

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−i ) ∀ s ∈ si.

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The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1).

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○ iteratively eliminate dominated strategies.

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The process of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads to a unique equilibrium (which is zero, if p < 1).

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Player has an incentive to deviate u(s∗i ,s∗.